<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xml:base="http://blog.torproject.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<channel>
 <title>metrics</title>
 <link>http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/metrics</link>
 <description>The taxonomy view with a depth of 0.</description>
 <language>en</language>
<item>
 <title>Measuring Tor and Iran (Part two)</title>
 <link>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran-part-two</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Two weeks ago we posted early measurements about the &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran&quot;&gt;growth of Tor usage in Iran&lt;/a&gt;. Since then we have improved our math, and used more data sources. This work is part of our &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/performance-measurements-and-blockingresistance-analysis-tor-network&quot;&gt;metrics project&lt;/a&gt;, where we&#039;re learning about the Tor network to improve its availability and performance while keeping our users safe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;!--break--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first graph shows the estimated number of new and returning Tor clients per day coming from China and Iran. So for example, there were around 7800 new and returning Iranian Tor users on June 24. By &quot;returning&quot;, we mean Tor clients that were off for at least several days, so they didn&#039;t have cached directory information. We added China as a comparison for the Iran numbers: you can see the results of the recent &lt;a href=&quot;http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2009/06/chinas-censorship-blowback.html&quot;&gt;Green Dam fiasco and attempts to block Google services&lt;/a&gt;. Many more details and math are &lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/metrics/master/report/dirreq/directory-requests-2009-06-26.pdf&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;350&quot; width=&quot;500&quot; src=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/files/new-returning-users-2009-06-30.png&quot;&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second graph shows the growth in bridge users coming from Iran and China. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.torproject.org/bridges&quot;&gt;Bridges&lt;/a&gt; are like normal relays except that they are not listed in a public directory and therefore they&#039;re harder to block. We show &quot;growth compared to June 1&quot; because we don&#039;t yet have a good estimate of the absolute number of bridge users. The number is probably an order of magnitude smaller than the number of &quot;regular&quot; Tor users. But still, we can say that bridge usage from Iran has boosted to 950% as compared to June 1. For more information on these numbers see &lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/metrics/master/report/bridges/bridges-2009-06-22.pdf&quot;&gt;this report&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;350&quot; width=&quot;500&quot; src=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/files/bridge-usage-2009-06-30.png&quot;&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While it is great to see that so many people in Iran find the Tor network useful, we should continue our attempts to make Tor even better. Your contribution could be to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay&quot;&gt;set up a bridge or relay&lt;/a&gt; as &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-growth-tor-network&quot;&gt;many others recently did&lt;/a&gt;. You might also consider setting up an exit relay, possibly with the help of &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment&quot;&gt;these instructions&lt;/a&gt;. But middle nodes and bridges are helping as well!&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran-part-two#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/bridges">bridges</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/iran">iran</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/metrics">metrics</category>
 <enclosure url="http://blog.torproject.org/files/new-returning-users-2009-06-30.png" length="22530" type="image/png" />
 <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 11:25:51 -0700</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>karsten</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">147 at http://blog.torproject.org</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>On the Recent Growth of the Tor Network</title>
 <link>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-growth-tor-network</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;In the past few days the Tor network is seeing a lot of new users &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran&quot;&gt;coming from Iran&lt;/a&gt;. At the same time we have heard from many people who want to support the Tor network by setting up more relays and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.torproject.org/bridges&quot;&gt;bridges&lt;/a&gt;. Now we wanted to know, are these just promises, or did the network really grow? Here are the results:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;!--break--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The number of relays has grown by 359 or 24% to now 1827 relays within only one week to the highest &lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/metrics/master/report/dirarch/dirarch-2009-06-22.pdf&quot;&gt;number of relays&lt;/a&gt; the network has ever seen. Likewise, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/metrics/master/report/bridges/bridges-2009-06-22.pdf&quot;&gt;number of bridges&lt;/a&gt; has increased by an incredible 69 % from 255 to 432 within one week. Awesome!&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;350&quot; width=&quot;500&quot; src=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/files/relays-2009-06-21.png&quot;&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;350&quot; width=&quot;500&quot; src=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/files/bridges-2009-06-21.png&quot;&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, does this mean everything is taken care of and no more relays or bridges are needed? Not at all! As you may know, Tor has some &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow&quot;&gt;performance issues&lt;/a&gt; that are, among other things, the result of too few bandwidth capacity for too many clients. If you can, go &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay&quot;&gt;setup more relays and/or bridges&lt;/a&gt; and keep them running even when the conflicts in the world do not hit the headlines. Be sure that your support is much appreciated!&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-growth-tor-network#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/bridges">bridges</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/metrics">metrics</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/performance">performance</category>
 <enclosure url="http://blog.torproject.org/files/relays-2009-06-21.png" length="15649" type="image/png" />
 <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2009 18:07:03 -0700</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>karsten</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">143 at http://blog.torproject.org</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>May 2009 Progress Report</title>
 <link>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/may-2009-progress-report</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;New releases&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On May 25, we released Tor 0.2.1.15-rc.&lt;br /&gt;
On May 17, we released Tor VM 0.0.2.&lt;br /&gt;
On May 25, we released Vidalia 0.1.13 containing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Remove an old warning on the relay settings page that running a bridge&lt;br /&gt;
    relay requires Tor 0.2.0.8-alpha or newer. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Add a workaround for a bug that prevented Vidalia&#039;s tray icon from&lt;br /&gt;
    getting added to the system notification area on Gnome when Vidalia was&lt;br /&gt;
    run on system startup. Patch by Steve Tyree. (Ticket #247) &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Fix a bug that prevented the control panel from displaying when&lt;br /&gt;
    running on the Enlightenment window manager. Patch by Steve Tyree. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Rename the CMake variables used to store the location of Qt&#039;s lupdate&lt;br /&gt;
    and lrelease executables. Recent versions of CMake decided to use the&lt;br /&gt;
    same variable name, which was stomping on mine, resulting in the wrong&lt;br /&gt;
    lupdate and lrelease executables being used. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Use the TorProcess subclass of QProcess for launching Tor when hashing&lt;br /&gt;
    a control password so we can take advantage of its PATH+=:/usr/sbin&lt;br /&gt;
    trick on Debian there too. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If a RouterDescriptor object is empty, don&#039;t try to display it in the&lt;br /&gt;
    router descriptor details viewer. (Ticket #479)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Wait until Vidalia has registered for log events via the control port&lt;br /&gt;
    before ignoring Tor&#039;s output on stdout. Previously we would start&lt;br /&gt;
    ignoring Tor&#039;s stdout after successfully authenticating, but before&lt;br /&gt;
    registering for log events which, in some cases, could lead to&lt;br /&gt;
    messages not appearing in the message log. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update many translations and remove others than are no longer&lt;br /&gt;
    up-to-date enough to be useful.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On May 25th, we released Tor Browser Bundle 1.2.0 containing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Switch to launching Firefox directly from Vidalia to&lt;br /&gt;
       allow multiple instances of Firefox &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update Firefox to 3.0.10 &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update to Qt 4.5.1&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update Firefox prefs.js to stop scanning for plugins &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update libevent to 1.4.11&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Include the Tor geoip database&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update Vidalia to 0.1.13&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Update Tor to 0.2.1.15-rc&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Design, develop, and implement enhancements that make Tor a better&lt;br /&gt;
tool for users in censored countries.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Matt added &quot;fetch bridges&quot; features to Vidalia 0.2.x.  This provides a link to automatically request bridges from &lt;a href=&quot;https://bridges.torproject.org&quot; title=&quot;https://bridges.torproject.org&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://bridges.torproject.org&lt;/a&gt; for users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Architecture and technical design docs for Tor enhancements&lt;br /&gt;
related to blocking-resistance.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Proposal 160 aims to let authorities modify the bandwidth they put in&lt;br /&gt;
the consensus for each relay. This step will allow us to adjust the&lt;br /&gt;
weights we advertise for clients, once the measurements from TorFlow&lt;br /&gt;
start giving us better weights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/160-bandwidth-offset.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/160-bandwidth-offset.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/160-ba...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Proposal 161 describes how node bandwidth ratios are&lt;br /&gt;
   computed and how they can be produced in parallel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-computing-bandwidth-adjustments.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-computing-bandwidth-adjustments.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-co...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Proposal 162 describes &quot;consensus flavors&quot;: the size of the networkstatus&lt;br /&gt;
consensus is critical, since every user fetches it every few hours. So&lt;br /&gt;
we need a way to add new fields -- and remove old fields -- in a way&lt;br /&gt;
that lets old clients continue to use the consensus. The current plan&lt;br /&gt;
is to build and distribute several different versions at once, so each&lt;br /&gt;
client can fetch the one with the format they expect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/162-consensus-flavors.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/162-consensus-flavors.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/162-co...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Proposal 163 starts to consider the problem of clients using relays as&lt;br /&gt;
single-hop proxies. If many clients start doing this (say, to improve&lt;br /&gt;
their own performance), it puts additional risk on the relays, since now&lt;br /&gt;
an attacker can expect to discover both client origins and destinations&lt;br /&gt;
by attacking the relay. Our current strategy for forcing clients to use&lt;br /&gt;
more than one hop is quite fragile, and it looks like we will soon need&lt;br /&gt;
more robust strategies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/163-detecting-clients.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/163-detecting-clients.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/163-de...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Proposal 164 suggests ways to make it easier for relay operators to&lt;br /&gt;
discover why they are not listed in the networkstatus consensus. We have&lt;br /&gt;
a handle of people each week ask us on IRC why their relay isn&#039;t listed,&lt;br /&gt;
and currently the only way to answer is to have a competent directory&lt;br /&gt;
authority operator go dig around in various files in his datadirectory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/164-reporting-server-status.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/164-reporting-server-status.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/164-re...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Proposal 165 focuses on simplifying the steps required to add a new&lt;br /&gt;
directory authority. The current approach requires manual work from every&lt;br /&gt;
directory authority operator within a space of several hours. As the&lt;br /&gt;
number of authorities grows, this synchronization is becoming impractical&lt;br /&gt;
-- and that&#039;s causing us to leave the number of authorities small, which&lt;br /&gt;
makes us vulnerable to other attacks. Once this proposal is finalized&lt;br /&gt;
and deployed, we&#039;ll hopefully be able to add new authorities more&lt;br /&gt;
smoothly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/165-simple-robust-voting.txt&quot; title=&quot;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/165-simple-robust-voting.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/165-si...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Grow the Tor network and user base. Outreach.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Jacob attended CONFidence in Krakow, Poland as a keynote speaker.  &lt;a href=&quot;http://2009.confidence.org.pl/&quot; title=&quot;http://2009.confidence.org.pl/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://2009.confidence.org.pl/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Andrew and Jacob attended the Soul of a New Machine conference in Berkeley, CA.  &lt;a href=&quot;http://hrc.berkeley.edu/events/newmachineconference/&quot; title=&quot;http://hrc.berkeley.edu/events/newmachineconference/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://hrc.berkeley.edu/events/newmachineconference/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Roger and Andrew attended the 7th Annual Chinese Internet Research Conference in Philadelphia, PA. &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/index.php?page=167&quot; title=&quot;http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/index.php?page=167&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/index.php?page=167&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Karsten attended SIGINT 09 in Cologne.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mike gave a presentation on TorFlow at CodeCon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Roger met with Nick, Paul Syverson and Aaron Johnson at Yale to work more on Paul&#039;s research question: if we trust some Tor relays differently than others, how should we select our paths to be safe, and how do we analyze how safe the paths are?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Roger did a talk for about 15 OSI people in Budapest, Hungary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Preconfigured privacy (circumvention) bundles for USB or LiveCD&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The two large changes were the ability to run multiple instances of Firefox at once, such that a user&#039;s personal firefox shouldn&#039;t share data with the firefox from our bundle.  The other change is the ability to stop TBB firefox from scanning the system for potential plugins, like Windows Media, Java, etc.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Started work on a hardened branch of Incognito live CD to help protect users from possible bugs in the programs running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Scalability, load balancing, directory overhead, efficiency.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We documented the metrics we collect to help us determine the best ways to scale the Tor network.  &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.torproject.org/blog/performance-measurements-and-blockingresistance-analysis-tor-network&quot; title=&quot;http://blog.torproject.org/blog/performance-measurements-and-blockingresistance-analysis-tor-network&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://blog.torproject.org/blog/performance-measurements-and-blockingres...&lt;/a&gt;  A number of nodes are now collecting this information to assist our network-wide measurements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Much progress on torctl and torflow tools being used to measure real and potential performance of nodes in the public tor network.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mike wrote proposal 161 describing how node bandwidth ratios are&lt;br /&gt;
   computed and how they can be produced in parallel.  The proposal can be found at &lt;a href=&quot;http://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-computing-bandwidth-adjustments.txt&quot; title=&quot;http://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-computing-bandwidth-adjustments.txt&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/proposals/161-com...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Karsten finished a first patch to dump statistics about local queues to disk every 15 minutes. A first impression of how these data could be evaluated can be found in &lt;a href=&quot;http://freehaven.net/~karsten/volatile/bufferstats-2009-05-25.pdf&quot; title=&quot;http://freehaven.net/~karsten/volatile/bufferstats-2009-05-25.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://freehaven.net/~karsten/volatile/bufferstats-2009-05-25.pdf&lt;/a&gt;. The goal is to see if our buffer allocation algorithms are sufficient or need tweaking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;More reliable (e.g. split) download mechanism.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Developed the ability to split Apple OS X bundles into 1.44MB chunks.  The functionality is native to OS X versions 10.4 and newer.  It will not work in versions 10.3.9 or earlier releases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Translation work, ultimately a browser-based approach&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
11 Polish updates&lt;br /&gt;
4 German updates&lt;br /&gt;
Portugese torbutton updates&lt;br /&gt;
Danish torbutton updates&lt;br /&gt;
Romanian torbutton updates&lt;br /&gt;
11 Italian updates&lt;br /&gt;
3 Chinese updates&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://blog.torproject.org/blog/may-2009-progress-report#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/anonymity-advocacy">anonymity advocacy</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/metrics">metrics</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/progress-report">progress report</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/proposals">proposals</category>
 <category domain="http://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/translations">translations</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2009 11:41:55 -0700</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>phobos</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">136 at http://blog.torproject.org</guid>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
