When ISPs or governments block access to the Tor network, our users rely on bridges to connect. With BridgeDB, we tackle the problem of how to get bridges to censored users while making it difficult for censors to get all bridges. A lot has changed since our last blog post, which introduced BridgeDB version 0.7.1.
Thanks to bridges, Tor users are still able to connect to the network when the public Tor relays are blocked. It's not enough to have many bridges: eventually, all of them could find themselves in block lists. We therefore need a constant trickle of new bridges that aren't blocked anywhere yet. This is where we need your help.
Atlas is a web application to learn about currently running Tor relays and bridges.
During the month of December, we're highlighting other organizations and projects that rely on Tor, build on Tor, or are accomplishing their missions better because Tor exists.
After ten years of volunteer maintenance of Tonga, Tor's bridge Authority—a piece of critical infrastructure within the Tor network—our colleag
Has a Tor bridge already been blocked in a given country?
Recently somebody asked me why our usage numbers in China are so low.