In February 2012 we learned that activists in Iran and Syria were targeted with two different types of malicious computer software.
Our progress report for February 2012 is now available. It hightlights recent work with deep packet inspection and censorship circumvention in Iran and Kazakhstan.
On Feb 9, Iran started to filter SSL connections on much of their network.
In September 2011 we made progress in a number of areas, such as handling issues in Iran's use of DPI to block tor, new versions of Tor, Tails 0.8 release, and more.
The short version: Tor relays and bridges should upgrade to Tor 0.2.2.33 or Tor 0.2.3.4-alpha so users in Iran can reach them again.
Here's a quick update on what we're seeing from Tor clients in Iran.
Over the past 48 hours it seems the Great Persian Firewall is updating to attempt to block a number of circumvention tools, including Tor.
Here's what the Tor Project accomplished in September 2009.
I was invited to join a panel discussion on Iran and New Media hosted by the Center for International Media Assistance and the National Endowment for Democracy.