I appreciate all your replies.

I read about signature verification of the zip file regarding manual installation.

I'd like to verify the whole Tor bundle AFTER an automatic update which I didn't trigger myself.

If there is an (automatic) signature verification process involved, it's transparent for the user and not acceptable in terms of security. We need feedback on this.

Think about a possible man-in-the-middle attack by a malicious exit-node redirecting your current tor browser to a 'modified' update / installation file (by spoofing the ips of torproject.org or the key server). In a talk Roger mentioned certain obsolete certificates being still implemented in the firefox browser engine. What if some 3-letter-agency was able to get or buy one? Your tor bundle could come with malware unnoticed. This attack scenario is bothering me since the beginning of tor.

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