Thanks to bridges, Tor users are still able to connect to the network when the public Tor relays are blocked. It's not enough to have many bridges: eventually, all of them could find themselves in block lists. We therefore need a constant trickle of new bridges that aren't blocked anywhere yet. This is where we need your help.
Our users rely on bridges if their ISPs or governments block access to the Tor network.
The goal of our study is to understand your expectations, assumptions, and habits when browsing onion services. For example, we are wondering: How do you keep track of onion domains? How do you discover new onion services? How do you know an onion service is legitimate and not an impersonation? By answering these questions, we can identify usability issues and build better anonymity technology.
This blog post is also availa
Over the last years, we learned a lot about how the Great Firewall of China is
We now have a wiki page which explains how bad relays should be reported to the Tor Project.
The 4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet is calling for papers.
Together with Stefan, I recently published the paper "Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious Tor Exit Relays".