Facebook, hidden services, and https certs

Today Facebook unveiled its hidden service that lets users access their website more safely. Users and journalists have been asking for our response; here are some points to help you understand our thinking.

Part one: yes, visiting Facebook over Tor is not a contradiction

I didn't even realize I should include this section, until I heard from a journalist today who hoped to get a quote from me about why Tor users wouldn't ever use Facebook. Putting aside the (still very important) questions of Facebook's privacy habits, their harmful real-name policies, and whether you should or shouldn't tell them anything about you, the key point here is that anonymity isn't just about hiding from your destination.

There's no reason to let your ISP know when or whether you're visiting Facebook. There's no reason for Facebook's upstream ISP, or some agency that surveils the Internet, to learn when and whether you use Facebook. And if you do choose to tell Facebook something about you, there's still no reason to let them automatically discover what city you're in today while you do it.

Also, we should remember that there are some places in the world that can't reach Facebook. Long ago I talked to a Facebook security person who told me a fun story. When he first learned about Tor, he hated and feared it because it "clearly" intended to undermine their business model of learning everything about all their users. Then suddenly Iran blocked Facebook, a good chunk of the Persian Facebook population switched over to reaching Facebook via Tor, and he became a huge Tor fan because otherwise those users would have been cut off. Other countries like China followed a similar pattern after that. This switch in his mind between "Tor as a privacy tool to let users control their own data" to "Tor as a communications tool to give users freedom to choose what sites they visit" is a great example of the diversity of uses for Tor: whatever it is you think Tor is for, I guarantee there's a person out there who uses it for something you haven't considered.

Part two: we're happy to see broader adoption of hidden services

I think it is great for Tor that Facebook has added a .onion address. There are some compelling use cases for hidden services: see for example the ones described at using Tor hidden services for good, as well as upcoming decentralized chat tools like Ricochet where every user is a hidden service, so there's no central point to tap or lean on to retain data. But we haven't really publicized these examples much, especially compared to the publicity that the "I have a website that the man wants to shut down" examples have gotten in recent years.

Hidden services provide a variety of useful security properties. First — and the one that most people think of — because the design uses Tor circuits, it's hard to discover where the service is located in the world. But second, because the address of the service is the hash of its key, they are self-authenticating: if you type in a given .onion address, your Tor client guarantees that it really is talking to the service that knows the private key that corresponds to the address. A third nice feature is that the rendezvous process provides end-to-end encryption, even when the application-level traffic is unencrypted.

So I am excited that this move by Facebook will help to continue opening people's minds about why they might want to offer a hidden service, and help other people think of further novel uses for hidden services.

Another really nice implication here is that Facebook is committing to taking its Tor users seriously. Hundreds of thousands of people have been successfully using Facebook over Tor for years, but in today's era of services like Wikipedia choosing not to accept contributions from users who care about privacy, it is refreshing and heartening to see a large website decide that it's ok for their users to want more safety.

As an addendum to that optimism, I would be really sad if Facebook added a hidden service, had a few problems with trolls, and decided that they should prevent Tor users from using their old https://www.facebook.com/ address. So we should be vigilant in helping Facebook continue to allow Tor users to reach them through either address.

Part three: their vanity address doesn't mean the world has ended

Their hidden service name is "facebookcorewwwi.onion". For a hash of a public key, that sure doesn't look random. Many people have been wondering how they brute forced the entire name.

The short answer is that for the first half of it ("facebook"), which is only 40 bits, they generated keys over and over until they got some keys whose first 40 bits of the hash matched the string they wanted.

Then they had some keys whose name started with "facebook", and they looked at the second half of each of them to pick out the ones with pronouncable and thus memorable syllables. The "corewwwi" one looked best to them — meaning they could come up with a story about why that's a reasonable name for Facebook to use — so they went with it.

So to be clear, they would not be able to produce exactly this name again if they wanted to. They could produce other hashes that start with "facebook" and end with pronouncable syllables, but that's not brute forcing all of the hidden service name (all 80 bits).

For those who want to explore the math more, read about the "birthday attack". And for those who want to learn more (please help!) about the improvements we'd like to make for hidden services, including stronger keys and stronger names, see hidden services need some love and Tor proposal 224.

Part four: what do we think about an https cert for a .onion address?

Facebook didn't just set up a hidden service. They also got an https certificate for their hidden service, and it's signed by Digicert so your browser will accept it. This choice has produced some feisty discussions in the CA/Browser community, which decides what kinds of names can get official certificates. That discussion is still ongoing, but here are my early thoughts on it.

In favor: we, the Internet security community, have taught people that https is necessary and http is scary. So it makes sense that users want to see the string "https" in front of them.

Against: Tor's .onion handshake basically gives you all of that for free, so by encouraging people to pay Digicert we're reinforcing the CA business model when maybe we should be continuing to demonstrate an alternative.

In favor: Actually https does give you a little bit more, in the case where the service (Facebook's webserver farm) isn't in the same location as the Tor program. Remember that there's no requirement for the webserver and the Tor process to be on the same machine, and in a complicated set-up like Facebook's they probably shouldn't be. One could argue that this last mile is inside their corporate network, so who cares if it's unencrypted, but I think the simple phrase "ssl added and removed here" will kill that argument.

Against: if one site gets a cert, it will further reinforce to users that it's "needed", and then the users will start asking other sites why they don't have one. I worry about starting a trend where you need to pay Digicert money to have a hidden service or your users think it's sketchy — especially since hidden services that value their anonymity could have a hard time getting a certificate.

One alternative would be to teach Tor Browser that https .onion addresses don't deserve a scary pop-up warning. A more thorough approach in that direction is to have a way for a hidden service to generate its own signed https cert using its onion private key, and teach Tor Browser how to verify them — basically a decentralized CA for .onion addresses, since they are self-authenticating anyway. Then you don't have to go through the nonsense of pretending to see if they could read email at the domain, and generally furthering the current CA model.

We could also imagine a pet name model where the user can tell her Tor Browser that this .onion address "is" Facebook. Or the more direct approach would be to ship a bookmark list of "known" hidden services in Tor Browser — like being our own CA, using the old-fashioned /etc/hosts model. That approach would raise the political question though of which sites we should endorse in this way.

So I haven't made up my mind yet about which direction I think this discussion should go. I'm sympathetic to "we've taught the users to check for https, so let's not confuse them", but I also worry about the slippery slope where getting a cert becomes a required step to having a reputable service. Let us know if you have other compelling arguments for or against.

Part five: what remains to be done?

In terms of both design and security, hidden services still need some love. We have plans for improved designs (see Tor proposal 224) but we don't have enough funding and developers to make it happen. We've been talking to some Facebook engineers this week about hidden service reliability and scalability, and we're excited that Facebook is thinking of putting development effort into helping improve hidden services.

And finally, speaking of teaching people about the security features of .onion sites, I wonder if "hidden services" is no longer the best phrase here. Originally we called them "location-hidden services", which was quickly shortened in practice to just "hidden services". But protecting the location of the service is just one of the security features you get. Maybe we should hold a contest to come up with a new name for these protected services? Even something like "onion services" might be better if it forces people to learn what it is.

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.

Excellent post!

yeah! it is..

What about tools like darkweb-everywhere, that help make hidden services easier to remember and/or access?

http://onion.im
https://github.com/chris-barry/darkweb-everywhere

Yeah, I thought about pointing to the darkweb-everywhere tool in the pet name discussion.

But ultimately I can't stand the name: I don't want to endorse names that end up with pictures of shadowy icebergs. This phrase 'darkweb' just magnifies and reinforces the FUD around hidden services.

We've been debating the names a lot lately -- I'm increasingly a fan of "the private web", as contrasted with the public web which is based on tracking you and profiting from that. It mixes together the security properties the user gets from Tor with the security properties the site gets from Tor. But you need both, so I'm ok with that.

Hey arma! I'm Colin Mahns, one of the developers on darkweb-everywhere.

The other developer Chris, along with myself have never been too happy with the name of the project and the connotations of "darkweb" (especially that iceberg picture, ugh). Problem is, neither of us can think of a name that describes what the project does any better than dwe. "privateweb-everywhere" might be a good alternative, but I don't know how the user might see this. What if a user loads our "privateweb" extension into their normal browser expecting it to function the same? It would break the internet for them pretty catastrophically. We are totally open to suggestions on how to rename this project though!

If you want to discuss this further or have any suggestions, I'm IDrinkMilk on IRC, and my email is colinmahns@riseup.net. Chris goes by acebarry on IRC and his email is chris@barry.im.

Maybe these can help.

-EVERYWHERE PLUGIN RENAMES:
----------------Preferred Names---------------------
SubNet-everywhere
FairNet-everywhere
Neutralweb-everywhere, NeutralNet-everywhere
CipherNet-everywhere
CloakNet-everywhere
HushNet-everywhere, HushWeb-everywhere
-------------------Other Options-----------------
darkweb-everywhere
StealthWeb-everywhere
Discreetweb-everywhere
Covertweb -everywhere
CuredNet-everywhere

-LinkSt8

Why not just onion-everywhere?

We had that name initially, but decided to use the all encompasing term "darkweb" since we have i2p rules as well. We keep coming back to onions-everywhere though :)

Colin

I checked out the list, it's awesome, and I think it's a great idea. but there's one concern: JavaScript may be enabled when visiting the onion version which might be security and privacy issue. (the leaks, and anonmity websites might be hacked and malwared to inject spyware and the like to the visitors' devicesso it's always a good idea to visit them via tor with javascript disabled).

Another thing, many of the websites have https support, so it would be great if you contact them and ask them to include their onion address in the certificate (like Facebook did) which add https on top of tor's encryption, increasing security and privacy.

Also, i2p isn't included in TorBrowser, so you might want to make a separate addon for i2p as it might be just a waste of storage and an unnecessary increase in size of the browser without any usability.

Thanks alot for your effort :)

Dude, user will visit the same website, if it is hacked it doesn't matter whether it's hidden or clear web. But otherwise there is no difference between visiting the either website with javascript. But actually clearnet is worse because it could be MITMed by three letter agencies

Javascript unfortunately is always going to be a problem for anyone. I keep mine disabled on my own browsers, and enable it when I need to. Of course, not every user is going to follow this...

Including the site in their HTTPS cert is actually something I personally hadn't considered until Facebook threw their .onions into their cert. I wasn't even sure a CA would issue a cert for a .onion until Friday!

The i2p rules were kept seperate until this afternoon after a discussion with Chris. It's easier to maintain a single directory of rules and keep them turned off, than what we had which was several smaller directories. The size of the extension didn't increase all that much, since we are talking about KB of a difference.

Thanks for your complement, I'm happy people are finding it useful :)

Colin

onions everywhere?

although, it would be better if it was merged upstream to HTTPS Everywhere - and it looks like it might be soon! https://twitter.com/bcrypt/status/528264250465083393

Eventually if enough sites follow facebook's lead it can have an "onions only" mode, like the new "HTTP nowhere" mode but better :)

I'd love to see it thrown upstream into HTTPS Everywhere. It's not confirmed if it will make it in yet though. Keep your fingers crossed :)

Colin

I think "Onions Everywhere" would be best.
Also, it would be great if you merge it with https everywhere as it is already shipped with Tor.
And thanks for you contribution to Tor :)

Just keep your fingers crossed! but not your toes!!! =D
Colin

Oh yes, I hate that iceberg picture. It tricked me into visiting a CP site.

SecureWeb.

chamelion-web.onion

In terms of combating total commercial overtake of the public internet, I've recently come to think of and refer to what you term the public web as the corporate web. I really believe that one should be very careful here with terms, as it would seem that
facebook is making inroads into "the private web" .

As facebook's business model is corporate surveillance (based on tracking you and profiting from that), this is a step towards merging the public and private webs and so leads towards the private web becoming commercialised.

Yes, I read and note your entire post. I would be concerned right now, that this, like all facebook moves is a win for facebook. And prudence is advisable where facebook is concerned.

Really?! You are hung up on the name and how it will sound and look?
You are way too political. Political correctness leads to corruption. Hypocrisy and double standard.

Politics should not have any say in anything related to privacy and security. Even if it is just a name.

Politicians will abuse every logical fallacy in the book anyway to get what they want and manipulate the stupid sheeples into thinking what they want them to think.

You give the politicians power just by thinking about how a name sounds. It is the same as feeding the trolls. They will know they have hit a nerve and will exploit that to get even more power.

It is called moral panic and "slut" shaming. It have become very popular.

Are you another sheeple or will you stand firm like a mountain, unaffected by the current weather?

In the real world, there are those with unbending dedication to their ideas who spend lifetimes aggravated that the world won't change for them. Then there are people who figure out how to implement ideas in our imperfect world. Names frame ideas and color perceptions and are truly important. And politicians use names like "patriot act" for that very reason. It worked. Better to make a real and positive difference with a little merchandising than to complain all day and die without impact.

I think Hidden Web is best.

hiddenweb-everywhere as well

I've started consciously and deliberately referring to TOR as the Autonomous-web-of-light (or liberation) (AWOL-Network) - in discussions with journalists signing up to our site. (this includes tech journos).

Referring to TOR as the 'dark-web' - is like calling the housed residents of Beverly Hills 'the BHH' - or Beverly Hills Hobos. It makes no sense as descriptive term.

LM (MediaDirect.org)

Onionland!

webland...

whats in a name?

Your article says it's safe to visit Facebook on Tor. But when I first got the Tor browser bundle I went to Facebook and had to log-in with my e-mail and password (because they thought I was in Romania or somewhere new and had a different IP address). The very next morning I went to Facebook on my non-Tor Firefox and it was riddled with massive moving banner ads that blocked my view constantly. But it only occurred using Firefox and I only had the problem on Facebook. I did a full virus scan and found nothing. Then I used another browser and it worked perfectly. So I uninstalled Firefox and reinstalled it. Same problem. Then I uninstalled Firefox and checked the box to NOT remember any of my settings, bookmarks, plug-ins, etc. Then I reinstalled Firefox and had no more trouble on Facebook. I decided it must be unwise to transmit personal info across Tor or go to any site that requires a log-in, email, passwords,etc. I got an email from FB about a new user accessing my account and I told them to block that IP. Then I changed my password. This has severely restricted my use of Tor. Also I spread the word about Tor to others and have told them not to use it on sites you have to log-into. HELP! krazyhorse48-tor@yahoo.com

"I got an email from FB about a new user accessing my account and I told them to block that IP" -- was that new user you, logging in via Tor earlier?

Assuming you were interacting with Facebook correctly, you'd be using https so an outside observer wouldn't be able to capture your credentials.

I don't want to say that nothing went wrong here, but there are a lot of things that it could have been.

Yes it was me they were referring to, but I didn't want that exit node to be able to access my FB in the future without me.

To be more clear, yes, I knew FB was referring to me 12 hrs earlier using Tor. But for years I never had any trouble on the web. Then I downloaded the Tor browser bundle about 6 months ago, which includes https everywhere. I didn't change any settings or add any extensions. I read all of Tor's safety tips on remaining anonymous.I got the "Congratulations you are now free to explore the web anonymously" message on the browser. The first thing I did was go to FB and log in. The next morning I had the problem on my non-Tor Firefox only on FB. I assumed the exit node owner had intercepted my unencrypted traffic and attached Firefox/FB adware to my machine or FB account. I'm not super tech savy. I'm just a privacy advocate. And btw, thank you all who work on Tor. I appreciate all that you do!

for "privacy advocate" - it is you who borrows ip address owned by exit node owner. And it is the site you connect to from that address spying on you.

This is certainly the best article dealing with this issue I have seen online today. It's concise and clears up all the misconceptions people have been forming about how Facebook apparently should not have a hidden service, that the onion (its first fifteen or sixteen characters) was bruted almost all the way, that Tor's main goal isn't to keep your entire identity concealed. Tor is for those who want choice in what they share. Facebook is making a forward step here and I just want to see how this plays out for them, and if this will be successful.

wowaname

>Facebook apparently should not have a hidden service

This blog post didn't mention that at all. If nything, facebook having a hidden service means it "legitimizes" it to regular people, and might be the catalyst Tor needs to have more people running dual setup sites. One clear and one hidden.

If you read my entire post, you would realise I didn't agree to whoever said Facebook shouldn't have a hidden service. I saw this posted on Hacker News and felt it to be wrong, since there are many legitimate uses for hidden services other than to hide a server's location.

wowaname

Great post, arma!

With respect to

…have a way for a hidden service to generate its own signed https cert using its onion private key, and teach Tor Browser how to verify them — basically a decentralized CA for .onion addresses…

This is an excellent idea, and I'd be glad to help out with implementation on the TorBrowser side, if we decide to do it. :)

Browsers treat https pages differently. For example, they refuse to load mixed active content by default, and they don't send Referer headers from https sites to http links. Accessing an onion service over http won't trigger these additional protections.

I like the idea of generating a certificate based on the onion service key - that would nicely map users' expectations of browser behaviour to the actual security properties of onion services, as well as forcing the browser to better meet those expectations.

One (apparently trivial) aspect that it would be good to reinforce, though, is that the cert needs to be exportable so that it can be put onto a backend server - or onto several servers behind a load-balancer. If the cert (or any supposedly equivalent solution) locks the SSL termination onto the same box which runs the Hidden Service, the result will be a scalability chokepoint.

Alec Muffett
Security Infrastructure
Facebook Engineering
London

thanks for such a fantastic article. roger, if your work doesn't win the nobel peace prize in my lifetime, my faith in humanity will basically be staked on you and nadia having kids.

Any of these sound good to you?

SERVICE NAMES
----------------Preferred Names---------------------
Discreet services
Stealth services
Humane services
Cipher services
Cipher services
Cryptic services
Sub services
Fair services
Neutral services
Cured services
-------------------Other Options-----------------
Onion services
Concealed services
Hush services
Covert services
Freeing services
Freed services
Liberating services
Cloaked services
Cloak services
Clandestine services
Reformed services
Progressive services
Balanced services
Demanded services

=======================================================
WEB ENCOMPASSING TERMS:
----------------Preferred Names---------------------
Stealth web
Humane web
Cipher web
Sub web
Neutral web
Cured web
-------------------Other Options-----------------
Private web
Onion web
Discreet web
Concealed web
Hush web
Covert web
Freeing web
Freed web
Cloaked web
Cloak web
Cryptic web
Reformed web
Fair web
Balanced web

-LinkSt8

Give it a rest.

Here is one more argument against "normal" certificates for onion domains. The problem is that they come with an OCSP responder address. Thus, the browser will go and contact that responder, potentially deanonymizing you. What Facebook should have done is to have OCSP response stapled - without it, the situation is even worse than unencrypted http.

That would still go through Tor, wouldn't it?

No, it won't on some browsers. Arguably this is a browser bug, but still, stapling the OCSP response would make the bug harmless.

https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=80722

Tor Browser should have disabled OCSP long ago, it's worse than useless because it has to FAIL OPEN since so many responders are unreliable. https://www.noisebridge.net/OCSP

The extra round trips also makes the first connection to each domain take longer.

How about modifying the Tor Browser, so that although all traffic in reality is sent through plain HTTP over Tor for .onion, the browser displays it as https://, with the padlock, so that users feel assured it is encrypted properly. Maybe even treat it is as HTTPS with regard to mixed content and referer and such, while still not in fact being it.

That would avoid the overhead of running both Tor's and HTTPS's encryption/end-to-end-authentication, and avoid enforcing the commercial CA model, while still avoiding confusion from users.

Should not be done in that way. Better make different padlock showing at pages which accessed securely via hidden service. And learn users about that.

As for naming challenges, I see two obvious paths.

A) rebrand "location-hidden service" and the .onion pseudo TLD to "tor service" and .tor (whilst retaining backward accessibility to .onion) (*)

B) yes, go with "onion network service" and leave all else unchanged.

(*) there is likely a big "dont brand stuff" argument, which is largely based on the concept of "ownership". The community who contribute to the code own the code, but it is copylefted with a very permissive license (thus forkable), and the network ownership is distributed amongst those who contribute to it (relays, bridges, directories etc.). So, I see the branding/ownership argument as poor.

Finally, I think that it is *excellent* that Facebook has added a .onion address. I completely disagree with their business model, and dont use their product, but their addition to the tor network will add to the legitimacy of the network in the eyes of the poorly educated, and may even improve the education of that community.

Isn't one argument in favor of using https for hidden services that it allows authentication of clients through client certificates? (Obviously, this isn't an argument that is relevant to the facebook case).

"Then they had some keys whose name started with "facebook", and they looked at the second half of each of them to pick out the ones with pronouncable and thus memorable syllables. The "corewwwi" one looked best to them..."

I find that story difficult to believe. Just how many conotations did they have to read through to find corewwwi? It surely must have been millions, billions, or more?

I don't buy it either. More likely a big company like Facebook wants an easy-to-remember address and has the resources for that.

I'm not great with C, but I would love to help out with the designs for the new onion services. What would be the best way to help?

Comments on part four:

There's another reason for wanting to have https to an onion address: guarantee that no other .onion site is proxying/MITMing the service's data stream, by showing that the .onion address has a key actually possessed (or at least authorized) by the one who owns the site.

The entire reason for third-party certification in TLS is to guarantee that you're talking with who you think you're talking to. Sure, Tor is self-authenticating, in that you can guarantee you're talking with "someone who has access to the key necessary to claim the .onion address". This is useful in a lot of circumstances. But, when your adversary can carry out low-cost attacks (such as low-cost ad campaigns which claim that access to your service can be gained at a particular .onion address that your adversary holds the private key to), it becomes much more important to have a third-party attestation of just who is providing the service, and who actually possesses the private key in question.

It is possible to use TLS without a server certificate. However, the web browser threat model is basically "the secure website must not be impersonated or transparently proxied". This is why web browsers specifically do not permit uncertified TLS. (Of course, there's a lot of legitimate anger that this works as an extortion racket; I personally support having multiple user interfaces for unauthenticated versus unauthenticated keyed versus third-party certified versus third-party extended validation, so that site operators can choose for their own sites what threat level they're willing to impose on their users, and turn it into an uncoerced market. Ultimately, .onion addresses provide unauthenticated-keyed connections, even though the browser doesn't understand how to provide any kind of useful UI with it.)

Right now, the CA/Browser Forum is debating how or even whether to put .onion addresses in TLS certificates. The debate appears to hinge on the idea of "alternate DNS roots", which are alternate entry points into alternate directories to look up names versus IP addresses. These have already existed, and have already had name-collision problems when ICANN chose to authorize new root names under its system that alternate DNS root providers had already allocated. A short-term fix for this could be for Tor to approach ICANN to ensure that it will not allocate a new .onion TLD, thus reserving it for the Tor network, for some (renewable) number of years. I don't know how likely this might be. This would cause some problems down the road, though, for other onion-routing topologies and softwares.

There's a couple of alternatives for how to handle certification of the .onion address. Certifying the .onion key at the Tor layer is not useful, because Tor does not have a certification field. This means that the certification of a Tor key would have to assign that key to the webserver as well; there's no communication between the web browser and the Tor software to verify that the key used for the .onion address and the certificate presented by the webserver even match. (Cryptographic digests inherently suffer a vulnerability called the "birthday attack": multiple messages can exist that compute to the same digest value. It is always important to check if the key itself matches, without simply checking that the digest itself matches.)

And please, get out of the thought that only the Tor browser is going to be used with Tor. Other protocols can use it, and other browsers can be used with it after setup; you can bet that as Tor catches on with service providers, other browsers are going to configure themselves to use Tor.

.onion name certification alternative 1: Certify the .onion key, and require the TLS server to have access to that specific certified key as the certificate for the TLS endpoint. I don't recommend this option, because it would increase the risk of that specific key being compromised and the "brand" of the .onion name being rendered worthless. It also flies in the face of good webserver key hygeine, which suggests that after a period of time you should always rekey your webservers.

.onion name certification alternative 2: Rely on the fact that the .onion name is already hashed and cryptographically bound to that key, and use that hash as the "proof of authority to use the name". Then, include the .onion name in a standard certificate over a separate keypair. I believe that this would be more secure and would lessen the potential risk to the brand, by reducing the attack surface against the name key. However, there are potential additional caveats to this option, as well. One is that CABF has deprecated SHA1 as providing less of a security strength than it is comfortable with. Another is that .onion addresses only encode half of the SHA1 in the first place, thereby halving the security strength that CABF is already uncomfortable with.

CABF is risk-averse and caveat-averse. Remember that Facebook could mine 40 bits of the SHA1. Computers are only becoming faster and more capable, and mining hashes efficiently is a known problem with documented approaches. This means that before too long 80 bits are going to be able to be mined cost-effectively, and Facebook's .onion name is going to suffer a collision. What will it do when that happens? (A bit of back-of-the-envelope arithmetic suggests that if every person on Earth [7.125 billion in 2013, according to Google] had a computer that could calculate 20-bit digest collisions in 8 seconds, like @ErrataRob on Twitter claimed that his did, it would take 20.58 minutes to try 2**40 possibilities. This doesn't mean that a collision would be found in 20.58 minutes, but the numerical possibility doesn't bode well in light of botnets and zero-day vulnerabilities.)

Ultimately, Tor is going to need to switch to a stronger digest algorithm, and encode more bits into the name. This is for the security of everyone, including the services who operate .onion servers. Determining how it's going to approach this problem should be a priority; as Tor is the de-facto manager of the .onion namespace, though, it's vital that it have a plan to do so. This will become even more important if/when ICANN officially allocates the management of the .onion TLD to Tor.

Ultimately, I'd like to see .onion be deprecated, for a .tor TLD that addresses the issues. The amount of work that would need to go into this, though, may be prohibitive.

Very interesting post. Thank you!

Not entirely on topic but while Facebook is taking actions to improve their PR with this move, Ello (a 'more private' alternative to Facebook) has decided to block Tor saying: "Access To Website Blocked".

Very interesting!

So, why would HTTPS://xyz.onion be better than a HTTP onion address that re-directs to the website that's running HTTPS with it's own cert? (For a website that offers clearnet and onion addresses.)

And how would Tor2Web figure into this discussion, because I'm sure many Facebook users don't have TB but may want to use the new onion address.

Why should the onion be https instead of http that is then forwarded to the https site over the clearnet?

1. because the http onion doesn't have to redirect to the website that's running https with its own cert.

2. because the http onion could serve drive-by malware to the browser. (remember that Tor Browser is not the only browser that can be used with Tor.)

3. because the exit node could block connections to the website that's running https with its own cert.

4. because the exit node could perform a POODLE or BEAST or other attack against the connection.

5. because the http onion could proxy the https site with full functionality, relying on people who know how Tor works to think that there isn't a man-in-the-middle attack happening at the boundary between security protocols.

6. because the http onion doesn't have to be owned by the owner of the target site, and could thus collect statistics that belong legitimately to the owner of the target site and potentially the requesting user.

7. because the http onion could collect browser fingerprinting data (such as canvas fingerprints) before forwarding the connection... and fail the forwarding if the fingerprint data isn't provided or is blank.

I'm certain there are other reasons.

Right. The reason not to use https directly to www.facebook.com is that any of the 300+ certificate authorities around the world can produce an https cert for www.facebook.com that your browser will trust. Those include Turkish Telekom, China has one, etc. Go read about Diginotar for an example of how this can go wrong:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar
The "CA infrastructure" is not particularly robust.

As for using tor2web to reach Facebook's new onion site, that is also a poor idea. It means you'll be using encryption between you and the tor2web site, and the tor2web site will be using encryption between it and Facebook, but the tor2web site will get to watch everything you do, as well as knowing both your location and your destination. In short, you'll get the sort of protections you get from using a single-hop proxy or a VPN, which is much weaker than the protections you get from going to a .onion site (whether it uses http or https) with Tor Browser.

See also
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/articles/circumvention-features.html#7

Regardless of whether it's secure or not, if you have a personal Facebook account you've got to ask yourself this question:

Would you want a company that is known for complete disregard for privacy, and hands data over to NSA/GCHQ easily to know that you are a user of TOR?

It's highly likely that the account you are using to store the fact that you are using TOR. NSA/GCHQ are known to target people who have searched for TOR on Google for example.

> NSA/GCHQ are known to target people who have searched for TOR on Google for example.

Then I was fucked when I was sixteen and started thinking this stuff was cool. May as well go all the way.

Also, I think people are deeply misinterpreting the "NSA are known to target people who search for Tor" thing. The reality seems to be that NSA are known to target all sorts of people for all sorts of things. It's easy to write new rules to target whatever they think of, so they've probably written a huge number of rules and generated a huge number of lists of people from them.

So would you rather they a) have a list of all the websites you've visited, or b) know that you're a Tor user?

The assumption that "if I don't go near Tor, they won't target me" is similar to the "I'm not interesting, so why would they go after me?" reasoning. It assumes we're in the old world where investigations take human time and energy so they have to focus them, rather than the new world where you might as well gather it all because that's cheaper than making decisions about what not to gather.

Even with their onion service you still cannot get into facebook without using javascript. Suspicious??

I am not convinced about Facebook accidentally coming up with that onion address the same way I am not convinced any even slightly sane person would opt to use FB, onioned or not.

While it's a good thing for tor reaching the masses, it certainly isn't a good thing for anonymity and privacy.

What FB really wants is to reach people in countries banning FB so that they can organize "orange revolutions".

About Part four:
A CA is a choke-point. Those are used for acquire and retain control, lock-in. A dictatorship that decides that is and is not a reputable service.

A choke-point is a weak point in the system that will be exploited.

You would effectively weaken the security, trust and validity of tor.
That tor really is an unbiased and uncensored system.

There are also legal and political issues to consider, if the above is not enough motivation.

Cert is a bad idea. Security system that trusts something is inherently broken.
When it comes to security you should not trust anything. Always assume lies and deception.
Even the so called transparency reports are untrustworthy and even a warning sign of deception. It is called trying too hard. "I will give you this to distract you from something else"

How can you really verify that nothing have been excluded from the "transparency" reports?
Openness, trust and transparency is a farce. Manipulation and deception.

Would need unfiltered access to the developers private financials, including friends and family members and so on. Spending habits.

Excluding the legal tax reason, this means nothing:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/transparency-openness-and-our-2013-financials
https://www.torproject.org/about/financials

Should we not be concerned that this author have political motivations?
Is tor getting corrupted from the inside out as cancer?
Why is the improvements and security bugs taking so long to implement. Why are they so hesitant?
After all american mean untrustworthy.

At least be funny and original if you are going to call me a conspiracy nut.

- A concerned tor user, living in fear of her life, the only thing left to take.

you raise a number of concerns here. what would you propose instead?

Go educate yourself. You sound like other propaganda machines.

I vote for these two approaches :

"One alternative would be to teach Tor Browser that https .onion addresses don't deserve a scary pop-up warning. A more thorough approach in that direction is to have a way for a hidden service to generate its own signed https cert using its onion private key, and teach Tor Browser how to verify them — basically a decentralized CA for .onion addresses, since they are self-authenticating anyway. Then you don't have to go through the nonsense of pretending to see if they could read email at the domain, and generally furthering the current CA model."

> Maybe we should hold a contest to come up with a new name for these protected services?

"TOR Protected Services"?

Thanks for clearing the question I had in mind
about FB apparently forcing/forging its onion selector !

Let me add as just a note that I (and I'm sure, not just I)
am very much annoyed at every suggestion and proposals
which rely on the assumption that Tor users must be
using the "tor browser". First, I (and many people I lnow) /hate/ Firefox and would never ever use it or a derivative thereof
for browsing with or without Tor,
and second, even if you happen to /like/ FF (one wonders what is to be loved there, but, hey! love is blind as we all know),
trying to impose "the" Tor browser - be it firefox in disguise or anything else - is dangerous as it goes against diversity, hence against security.

Not to mention the self evident point that Tor is not JUST for browsing the (private?/public?) webz !

Please Tor folks, stop supporting Firefox exclusively, it is a disservice to the community in my very humble opinion.

Yes, I'd also love to live in a world where you could use any browser you like with Tor. The problem is that all browsers have huge privacy problems. Firefox is the one we've spent the most time and energy fixing, and that set of fixes (available in a fork called Tor Browser) is the only one we can recommend. To be clearer, there are known fingerprinting and/or deanonymization bugs in all the others.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#TBBOtherBrowser

For example, you might like the "why not Chrome" section of
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/isec-partners-conducts-tor-browser-hardening-study
for further reading.

And finally, you're right, there are other things to do on the Internet besides web browsing. But if you're using any complex program that hasn't been audited specifically for Tor, the odds are good that it has some privacy bugs :( since not enough developers think about privacy when writing their programs. This is a huge area that needs more help in many ways.

I have also often wondered about a "lighter" TBB, perhaps one with Midori, but I understand your point of view and how much hard work maintaining a secure bundle is.

Which brings my question, would a VM-based model like Whonix allow for more versatility? For example, instead of using the Whonix-provided browser VM using your own VM with another browser of your choice?

An isolating proxy solution (for instance Whonix) does reduce some concerns but doesn't make you any harder to fingerprint. That's why the Whonix devs still suggest you only run Tor Browser - albeit slightly altered to eliminate tor over tor.

See:
www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor%20Browser#Anonymity_vs_Pseudonymity
www.whonix.org/wiki/DoNot#Do_not_confuse_Anonymity_with_Pseudonymity.

Seeing that the threat of CAs to our society is no longer theoretical, we had a chat at https://hidden-id.github.io and came up with a name for an idea that was brewing for a while.

So far it's only a wiki. Feel free to comment

https://github.com/hidden-id/stakehouse/wiki/Stake-House:-Certification-without-authority

Potential issue: Now we're hitting an HTTPS URL the first (maybe every?) time we hit the .onion URL. So any way to detect a visit to that site under Tor+HTTPS is now also detecting you even though you did the "safe" thing and used the .onion address.

I don't see the issue. Are you worried about a website fingerprinting attack, where they look at your encrypted traffic flow and guess what site you're connecting to? Seems to me that using https doesn't make these attacks any worse.

hi nice!

It should be kept in mind that facebook is just another surveillance project. It has all properties. And it is most intrusive, the users give all their data about every aspect of their lives. The NSA does the same, but without people knowing about it for the most part. Facebook is severe data retention. The NSA is larger, but both are doing the same. Think about that. Most websites have like-buttons which tell facebook on pageload who opens which websites, even without being logged on to facebook. This isn't funny anymore.

The certificate isn't just to stop MitM between Facebook's hidden service and Facebook's core, but to give users confidence that the hidden service is run by Facebook. The certificate is not for facebookcorewwwi.onion, but for *.facebook.com with a subject alt name of facebookcorewwwi.onion. This is not something the browser UI makes obvious, but it at least gives visitors to the hidden service who care to check a good degree of assurance that it belongs to the same owner as facebook.com. Before issuing a certificate for facebook.com, the CA would have performed at least some checks that the request really came from Facebook.

Hi arma!

I have recognized that Facebook now blocks Tor users who visit the normal https web site. They call it "bad ISP".

I guess they only let you use Facebook over Tor if you come via the onion-address.

Gosh. I hope this isn't true. Or at least, I hope it's a transient bug or something.

i can confirm that the https site is reachable from at least one tor exit

This is true .
Chances of this happening is not so uncommon and increased over time . Not a bug .
Recently having hard time using FB over Tor .
One more thing , you haven't mentioned anything about FB's mandatory javascript on requirement !

Hi.

This (blocking) should not be the case - or, if blocks have been put in place for a given exit node then it is not because of its status as a Tor exit node, and in time the blocks will likely expire or be removed.

The goal of the experimental Facebook onion address is to provide a more accessible and secure Tor-based means of access to Facebook in addition to what is already available.

We currently see no benefit in intentionally blocking legitimate access via Tor exit nodes, not least because Tor exit nodes are publicly listed and easily identified and there appears to be little value in prioritising one form of Tor-sourced traffic over another. It is possible that this stance may change in future but I find it difficult to comprehend what benefit would come from doing so.

In the meantime I would also like to take this opportunity to remind everyone that the Facebook onion address is an experiment and that there will be implementation and user-interface changes as time progresses. As mentioned in the original blog post, one of these will be work related to possibly making the Facebook mobile website available, which might also provide also features which have been requested by many people who access Facebook over Tor.

In the process of deployment there may be occasional brief service outages, but we shall endeavour to minimise such surprises.

Again, to quote the blogpost: the onion service is "of an evolutionary and slightly flaky nature".

Best wishes :-)

Alec Muffett
Security Infrastructure
Facebook Engineering
London

Alec, many thanks for your Tor-friendly activity and that you stay in touch with the Tor community.

My opinion on not requiring typical CA model would be to utilize DNSChain via http://okturtles.com/ it utilizes DANE protocol with decentralized blockchain storage via Namecoin.

It really is a step in the right direction to solving this issue.. It can even make registrars obsolete. Checkout the code its worked on constantly.

https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain

Pardon for going slightly offtopic but I think it still fits in here somehow.
How do you plan to address services that routinely block Tor, e.g. CloudFlare? In the past months more and more websites have become inaccessible via Tor and the number keeps growing. It's only a matter of time until this will become a major issue. We now have awesome tools to circumvent blockage on ISP level but it's still very easy for destination servers to block Tor users via exit node list.

Concerning Facebook, I think it is just a matter of how you use it. Noone forces you to reveal personal information, I solely use it to obtain such from others. Also keep in mind that quite a lot of political activists use the site, for them the ability to remain anonymous may be extremely crucial.

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-helping-internet-services-accept-anonymous-users

This could also allow for clear distinction between tor and non tor users. As we already know, anonymity systems are a breeding ground for unscrupulous behavior that undermines legitimate use. Normal facebook users would previously see this behavior and dismiss it as random trolling or contamination. If FB now chooses to clearly distinguish tor users, such behavior will now be by many previously unaware, directly associated with tor, it's users and the anonymity world altogether. This could reverse growth by slowly programming users of the social giant to detest Tor/Anonymity users because of the acts of the immature and inconsiderate. I mean, wow! The crap I've seen submitted to facebook by likely untraceable users is without a doubt the worst thing a person will see in their lifetimes. A deep scar experienced by a huge user base with a clear link to TOR. Time to take mitigating steps.

P.S. I wonder the costs incurred by FB for this undertaking. How profitable will this be? Hidden services are currently very inefficient. Only a fraction of tor users access facebook using tor. Censoring governments could (if tor users are now labeled) then more effectively target it's users. If FB helps to improve the HS protocol, great! Otherwise we could likely walk away from this with a darker cloud over the anonymity scene with nothing to show for it other than a foul experience cause of some impulsive small minded closet monsters. This of course predicated on tor user labeling.

Remember that it was already easy for Facebook to recognize Tor users -- they're the ones coming from Tor exit relays.

Exactly. The facebook administrative are aware of the difference but average users could (if tor users are clearly labeled when using this new service) now see the distinction. Now your everyday clearnet user will be able to associate abuse and tom fuckery with Tor users. This could have a slow degenerative effect on public opinion regarding tor and anonymity.

Example:

A troll befriends a large number of unsuspecting clearnet users then drops a picture bomb like cp. Clearnet users are scarred, panic, and report the atrocity. Facebook admins respond in several ways and assures it's users. These users move on scarred but unaware that tor was used to drop the image that's caused so much turmoil in their psyche. Things go on as it has been.

Now, if facebook admins choose to clearly label a tor user as such. Any inappropriate behavior on part of the tor user will be easily associated with tor. Clearnet users will now know and attribute the misuse of facebook to the perpetrating tor users.

With facebooks far reaching social structure, it's feasible that a small group of attackers could ruin tor's public image by gathering a large amount of facebook "friends" over a period of say 3 to 6 months to then finally drop a cp bomb viewed by millions. If each of those viewers could easily link the image to tor, then game over. Public outcry would be enormous and arguing the primary goal of tor and it's benefits could fall on dead ears. Most people can't think rationally when angry, and as we all know cp is endless fuel.

Facebook is massive with a great degree of exposure. Tor users and the tor dev team need to tread lightly. Else a massive outcry for it's ban could occur. If not an outright ban then at a least gradual degradation of it's image would occur. I don't have a FB account so they're likely some flaws in my understanding of the capabilities of it's users. Though if the above can hold true then the Tor dev team must urge FB not to label it's tor users. I can imagine some three letters agencies drooling at this potential attack vector. Sway public opinion and you don't have break tor, just wipe it away like a smear on a windshield.

I don't think Facebook does currently, or has plans to, label users publicly with whether they're using Tor.

Another way to fingerprint your surfing habits and link you to your real identity... TOR dev's might as well come out a say "Were working closely to fool you into thinking you are safe but in reality we want a nice trail of your surfing habits to give to the NSA" Forgetting TOR is majorly funded by DARPA? WAKE UP!!

Tor isn't limited to only routing the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) of the World Wide Web. Tor is capable of routing many other application layer protocols, such as Ricochet's custom protocol. I consider 'net' instead of 'web' to more accurately reflect Tor's capabilities.

I dont understand this.

Whats the point of setting this up if,

1. facebook continues to block tor traffic with checkpoints.
2. facebook filters out tor traffic when trying to register. forces phone verification.
3. facebook checkpoints and auto locks outs users with pre existing accounts that connect over tor

ok. So I bite the bullet and connect my phone to my Facebook account since im locked out for connecting over tor.

thats solves the problem 15 minutes. but then im asked to upload a form of ID or drivers license to unlock my account. Thats just to far in my opinion.

None of this makes any sense whatsoever. Why even waste the time and resources brute forcing the onion address and setting up a hidden service that is borderline useless.

Almost feels like an April Fool's joke. Best thing fb ever did, now if they could just reform the rest of their terrible privacy policy...

As far as I know there is a website called "Torbook" in the dark net
here its address http://torbookdjwhjnju4.onion/
I know it from ahmia.fi quite funny isn't it?

*******************
Exit Node not working for facebook onion site.

I configured an exit node of France to use Facebook onion website but the onion website always pick up random exit node. Another thing, the IP address logged by Facebook (which we can view in the security options' last log in info) is always that of UK.

Is there any problem with my browser or is it that all onion sites use exit nodes randomly?

Facebook over Tor - froze my tor browser when tried to access

I wouldn't trust Facebook further than I could through Zuckerburg. Zuckerburg just looks, well... just ;) Look what happened to torrent sites when they moved onto the pages of the BBC website (always a bad sign) and became more "mainstream" - ISPs started blocking them (now we was to use Tor to access them). Saying that it does solve the "bad IP" nonsense when trying to access Facebook through Tor... although the site still "works better with JavaScript enabled ;) We will have to wait and see how this pads out...

Another thing, that "one more step... you appearing to be using an anonymising network" ... here is a stupid capcha to fill in that a more and more websites

If a singular huge network had the majority of exit routers all working at the same time?
I have to ask doesn't this have implications for Tor security.

If Tor is massive it doesn't matter but if you got a proportionally massive amount of use on a single network then trouble?

Also the use of certs and any browser all sounds a really bad idea to me.

?

It is very nice to see https together with onion, Not for tls itself, As if it is Run On the same machine it would be only adding Extra round trips and thus increasing latency upon Connection BUT:
There Are some nice benefits of this Setup see:
facebookcorewwwi.onion:443 direct:// spdy/3.1
fbcdn23dssr3jqnq.onion:443 direct:// spdy/3.1
This means, SPDY through darknet is increasing your Connection throughput alot. You can compare or Benchmark it On your own by Connecting To http://facebookcorewwwi.onion:80 and actually feel the difference. For load balancing reason they may offloading by https Proxy wich means in this Setup your Connection is encrypted even To the last End. See Facebook Statement, Look nsa google internal Network unencrypted eavedropping traffic papers.

With https, a Site can authenticate To users. If the Site gets MitM or proxyed you would notice a different cert. Or if onion key gets stolen/Lost.

SPDY by Default requires TLS!

Facebook joining the onion web is a major plus for tor:

. More people will begin to hear about Tor and more companies will start to use it like Facebook > more Tor users > more anonymity for the whole network

. More contributions will come to Tor, like funding and devs who want to help, including from Facebook of course

. It will give some sort of legitimacy to Tor, and especially to the onion web, weakening the adversary's argument that Tor is "only used by criminals", as they will no longer be able to use that arguments for they will be calling Facebookers "criminals" something which Facebook itself will not accept

I think "protected services" is really slick. I for one like being protected

"protected services" is too heavy on the tongue, and "hidden web" and "dark web" also includes i2p and other anonymity software, so the best name is "onion web".

How To Use Facebook Over Tor Without Javascript

https://www.facebook.com/notes/alec-muffett/how-to-use-facebook-over-tor-without-javascript/10152913034535962

Alec Muffett
Security Infrastructure
Facebook Engineering
London

If I type facebookcorewwwi.onion at my Tails browser at the first connection it is changed to facebook.com

Actually, you have an entry point to facebook, but you browse all the time with a regular .com address.

Not in my TAILS, could it be your htttps everywhere plugin? it's not redirecting me to facebook.com, it's still facebookcorewwwi.onion

Why not use NameCoin instead of developing our own pet-name system? There are already provisions for .onion and .i2p addresses to be mapped to human readable .bit names in a cryptographically secure way. It's secure, decentralized, and globally unique. Sure, it costs money, but global names are a scarce resource after all. Read "Squaring Zokoo's Triangle" by Aaron Schwartz.

Facebook is FBI's favorite honeypot.

The actions by U.S. and European law enforcement over the last few days shows you are not as anonymous as you think you are.

From the BBC:

"Huge raid to shut down 400-plus dark net sites...

Tor is home to thousands of illegal marketplaces, trading in drugs, child abuse images as well as sites for extremist groups."

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-29950946

Just hot on the heels of facebook's embracement of Tor... ;) 2+2=?

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous

As for connection the Facebook hidden service... this sort of coordinated raid takes weeks or months to prepare. It's very likely just a coincidence. Seems like every week is a nice thing to discuss about Tor, and surely they can't all possibly be related. :)

I definitely prefer adding https to onion websites, more protection(s) is always more preferred. because we're in a cat/mouse game with the adversaries, and full foolproof everlasting anonymity is impossible (I know what I'm talking about...), it's really all about making it much harder and time consuming to be deanonymized, because after all:"technology will always fail you" - the Moscow rules.

One unmentioned benefit of wide spread usage of hidden services is that it makes traffic analysis of all Tor users harder.

Imagine in future, darkweb-everywhere getting merged into https-everywhere and into Tor Browser and new major websites creating a hidden service alternative. Then good luck to NSA figuring out what all these terrorists are doing on Tor :)

Microsoft Outlook also does a similar thing to Facebook in that it makes you "verify your account" if you try to sign-in from a "different, location, device" etc. All in the name of "security" of course ;) At least you can still set up an Outlook account using Tor :)

what's in a name ? - WEBB-LAND !

there is way too much blind trust in centralised ssl/tls "verification"!

forcing people to allow untrusted third parties to block their stuff is leaning a huge backdoor open to censorship!

what if a CA is compromised by court order or corporate takeover?

If users are using ssl/tls over tor and anyone's browser does any direct requests to a CA to check certificates that would leak the users IP to the CA.

and if what they are using is facebook? .. facebook might even OWN a CA
(if they do they would have access to whatever gets logged there!)

btw none of this has anything to do with encryption ... they need to let people encrypt what they want when they want and stop forcing people to open up some pretty serious risks everyone seems to be ignoring!

(don't let censorship sneak in via the back door!)

if anything causes a browser to to a direct request to a CA to check a certificate, the CA would be able to log the users IP .. (stating the obvious)

TLS and anonymity are contradictions as long as they keep trying to fool people into thinking ssl is some kind of "magic bullet" for everything.

It certainly has its uses but there are also risks associated with the centralised verification (as with anything that could enable unknown or untrusted companies to block things - think about misuse for sneaky forms of CENSORSHIP - what is there to prevent CA's from being bullied or compromised by court orders or takeovers?)

and the fact that too many things try to force such centralised verification to be used for everything - even when its obviously inappropriate, just to be able to use the encryption in the browser seems rather suspicious in itself..

if it was really about security (from the user perspective) those browser warnings would more clearly explain what was checked and by whom rather than just say "untrusted/unsafe/etc" with UI designed to scare users rather than encourage them to read or think about what they SHOULD consider before deciding what to do next - if something says "untrusted" a user should always think about WHAT, BY WHOM and FOR WHAT PURPOSE .. without considering those additional questions the term is meaningless and actually very dangerous.

maybe users blindly trusting that some magic will "take care of it" is "security" from the perspective of the nsa/chinese government/whatever perspective.. but any attempt to force on everyone something so centralised capable of being misused to block anything public is potentially dangerous and people do need to consider those other risks.

(the censorship threats are still out there - and getting sneakier - wake up before its too late!)

re facebook via tor using a .onion certificate
.. think about browsers doing direct requests to CAs

surely that WOULD leak the user's IP to the CA... and facebook might even own a CA!

So before Facebook landing with an onion URL was it impossible to visit using TOR? What did it change?

Thanks,

What are we even thinking about using "certificates" over Tor!?

"Part four: what do we think about an https cert for a .onion address?"

Using HTTPS in addition to Tor does, according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, add additional security/anonymity to a user's connection. The following EFF link is an interactive graphic which shows the effect of using Tor alone, Tor + HTTPS, HTTPS alone or neither.

https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https

Peter Wills

So what is up with the PLEASE VERIFY IDENTITY step in the signup process?
Facebook keeps asking for a mobile phone number or identity documents when i try signing up at https://facebookcorewwwi.onion.

I think there is an exploit there.
1) You have to enable javascript to sign up.
2) After signing up facebook ask me to confirm my identity with a mobile phone number or legal documentation of my identity.

You can't report things "anonymously" if you give a mobile phone number or fax copies of your ID.

I suppose this will be censored by you so called freedom lovers again though.

Syndicate content Syndicate content